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92 
Response 
Comment: “Anticompetitive Effect” 
Daniel R. Shulman† 
This Comment will respond to the article Anticompetitive 
Effect, by Richard Cudahy and Alan Devlin (Article).1 At the 
outset, one must say that it is an honor to be asked to respond 
to what is an important, insightful, and elegantly presented 
piece of scholarship, commentary, and analysis. The issue ad-
dressed, anticompetitive effect, is central both to understanding 
antitrust jurisprudence and to its productive future develop-
ment and application. The central conclusion of the Article, 
that “an aggregate welfare approach to competition” and anti-
competitive effect is preferable to a “consumer welfare” ap-
proach, is unassailable and well supported, in my view. 
There are, however, two aspects of the Article that warrant 
expansion and further comment. The first is the Article’s re-
view of the history of antitrust jurisprudence since the passage 
of the Sherman Act, the changes over time in judicial attitudes 
and analysis, and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. The 
second is the practical ramifications of what is at stake in the 
debate between whether to apply a total welfare or consumer 
welfare standard, and, in particular, what this means in terms 
of antitrust enforcement and actual antitrust litigation prac-
tice.  
With regard to the Article’s discussion of the history of an-
titrust, what the Article reveals, if not quite declares, is that 
through the political process and politicization of antitrust juri-
sprudence, the very aggregations of concentration and economic 
 
†  The author is a principal in the law firm of Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty 
& Bennett, P.A., in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He has been practicing antitrust 
law for forty years, with roughly seventy-five percent of his practice 
representing plaintiffs and twenty-five percent defendants. Further informa-
tion is available at http://www.gpmlaw.com/professionals/daniel-r-shulman.aspx. 
Copyright © 2011 by Daniel R. Shulman. 
 1. Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
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power that the antitrust laws were originally meant to attack 
and confine have now gained control of antitrust jurisprudence. 
Moreover, they have in fact used antitrust laws to aggrandize 
and insulate their power and prerogatives from attack, not only 
substantively, but procedurally. 
As to the practical ramifications of the Article, the choice of 
an aggregate welfare measure of anticompetitive effect versus a 
consumer injury measure will have profound consequences in 
terms of whether there will be effective antitrust enforcement 
and by whom. Choosing consumer injury as the standard will 
have the effect of further emasculating enforcement and pre-
serving the power of those who now have control of the system, 
the very interests the antitrust laws were enacted to challenge 
and limit. 
The Article is perceptive and profound in recognizing the 
pivotal issue in antitrust today as being whether anticompeti-
tive effect should be defined based on impairment of the com-
petitive process at whatever level that impairment occurs (i.e., 
the aggregate or total welfare standard), or whether anticompe-
titive effect should turn on impairment to consumer interests 
alone, and hence require a showing of higher prices, lower out-
put, poorer quality, or reduced choice for consumers (i.e., the 
consumer-welfare standard). What the Article could have expli-
cated further—which this Comment will endeavor to do—is (1) 
the underlying historical power struggle that has brought anti-
trust to the point where the definition of anticompetitive effect 
has become so critical to antitrust’s continued viability, and (2) 
the very serious practical consequences, in terms of public and 
private enforcement, of choosing one definition of anticompeti-
tive effect over the other. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST   
The history of antitrust traced in the Article is substantial-
ly accurate, except for a few minor points to be addressed he-
reafter. There are, however, two areas where the Article could 
have gone farther. The first is the conclusions to be drawn from 
the underlying historical facts so ably set forth by the Authors, 
specifically that the regulated have now become the regulators 
and how they got there. The second area, which the Article does 
not touch, is the profound procedural changes that have oc-
curred contemporaneously with changes in the substantive law 
of antitrust, and how they have been equally instrumental in 
allowing the regulated to become the regulators. 
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In tracing “the evolving concept of ‘anticompetitive’ beha-
vior,” the Article correctly observes, “Congress passed the 
Sherman Act at a time of powerful public aversion to the trusts 
that had enveloped the economy.”2 The Authors also advert to 
Learned Hand’s citing with approval, in United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America,3 the comments of Senator Sherman in 
the legislative history of the Sherman Act: 
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social 
order, and among them all none is more threatening than the inequa-
lity of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a 
single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combi-
nations to control production and trade and to break down competi-
tion. These combinations already defy or control powerful transporta-
tion corporations and reach State authorities. They reach out their 
Briarean arms to every part of our country. They are imported from 
abroad. Congress alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling or 
unable there will soon be a trust for every production and a master to 
fix the price for every necessity of life.4 
Judge Hand himself expressed similar sentiments and con-
cerns: 
Be that as it may, that was not the way that Congress chose; it did 
not condone ‘good’ trusts and condemn ‘bad’ ones; it forbad all. Moreo-
ver, in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives 
alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to 
prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success 
upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of 
those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These considera-
tions, which we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, 
we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.5 
The Authors correctly observe, “From this perspective, it 
was not the inefficiency of monopoly that invoked antitrust’s 
wrath, but the sociopolitical power that such dominance bes-
towed on its holder.”6 The Authors add, “It is not at all clear 
that the first fifty years of antitrust jurisprudence was based on 
a misconception of original legislative intent.”7 They conclude 
that “the legislature likely sought to facilitate a vigorous 
process of competition that would promise to bring about a va-
riety of benefits, which might include the diffusion of economic 
 
 2. Id. at 67. 
 3. 148 F.2d 416, 428 n.1 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 4. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890); see also 21 CONG. REC. 2598 (1890). The 
term “Briarean arms” refers to Briareus, a giant of Greek mythology with one 
hundred arms and fifty heads. 
 5. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427 (emphasis added). 
 6. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 68. 
 7. Id. 
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power, reduced levels of concentration, and free access to mar-
kets and consumers, as well as efficiency gains.”8 Indeed. 
In this regard, the legislative history is particularly in-
structive, as traced by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp in Anti-
trust’s Protected Classes.9 Professor Hovenkamp rejects and 
persuasively rebuts the claims of Robert Bork and Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, leading proponents of the Chicago school of eco-
nomics, that the Sherman Act was passed in order to protect 
consumers from high prices.10 Rather, the primary concern of 
Congress was the immense concentration of economic power in 
the trusts existing at the time and their consequent ability to 
exclude small competitors. For example: 
Much of the wrath of the Sherman Act’s framers was directed at the 
sugar trust and at Standard Oil Company of Ohio, then facing a 
forced dissolution and reorganization under the corporate law of New 
Jersey. Were the real complaints about the sugar trust and Standard 
Oil directed at their high prices? Hardly. From 1880 through 1890, 
the price of refined petroleum in the United States fell by sixty-one 
percent, by far the largest decrease in a decade of generally decreas-
ing prices, and there was over the same period an almost four-fold in-
crease in output. The Standard Oil Company was responsible for 
much of this, and some members of Congress knew it. . . . 
  The sugar trust, Congress’ other big target and the subject of the 
Supreme Court’s first Sherman Act decision in 1895, showed the 
same kind of performance, although the price decreases were not as 
dramatic. . . . 
  One might suggest that although prices in fact fell during the 
1880s, the common belief was that prices were rising and Congress 
was responding to this perception. But that does not seem to be the 
case either. Most of the contemporary evidence established without 
controversy that prices were indeed falling, a fact that contemporary 
economists readily confirmed. In fact, “ruinous competition” was per-
ceived to be a much bigger threat than high prices.  
  So to posit that Congress’ principal concern in enacting the Sher-
man Act was high consumer prices is to suggest that Congress was 
dealing with a problem that did not exist. To be sure, economists had 
already developed a predatory pricing theory that dominant firms 
might use temporary periods of low pricing in order to drive out com-
petitors and charge higher prices later. But as of 1890 the trusts had 
not succeeded in doing this. The principal victims of the trust move-
ment of the 1880s—certainly of the trusts that appeared most fre-
quently on Congress’ hit list—were inefficient small firms, rather 
 
 8. Id. at 68–69. 
 9. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
23–24 (1988).  
 10. Id. at 22–30.  
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than consumers. Competitors were the principal protected class of the 
Sherman Act.11 
The foregoing perspective is important because it is histor-
ically supported and accurate, and indeed informs Supreme 
Court antitrust jurisprudence through the Warren Court. 
Those who have rejected and criticized it, such as Bork and 
Easterbrook, have done so based on misrepresentation of the 
historical record, as well as on the so-called free-market eco-
nomics of the Chicago school, now discredited by the events of 
the current worldwide economic crisis, about which more later. 
It is important here to stress the historical underpinnings of 
the Sherman Act in order to truly understand the forces behind 
the fundamental change in antitrust jurisprudence over the 
last four decades. In particular, the cover story propounded by 
the advocates of change—that antitrust law is returning to the 
true intent of Congress to protect consumers from high prices 
and abandoning the misguided populism of the Warren Court—
is a myth, and needs to be recognized as such. Instead, some-
thing else has occurred: those with power who were meant to be 
regulated have taken over the regulatory process and become 
the regulators. 
Continuing their historical survey, the Authors comment 
that “[p]erhaps surprisingly, the story of early U.S. antitrust 
law is one of inaction,” and that “[a]ntitrust enforcement came 
of age in the celebrated 1911 case of Standard Oil.”12 With all 
due respect, the period from 1890 to 1911 contained a number 
of significant antitrust decisions by the Supreme Court, among 
them United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,13 Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,14 and Northern Securities Co. 
v. United States.15 Of particular importance is the language in 
Trans-Missouri, decided only seven years after passage of the 
Sherman Act, stressing the importance of preserving small 
businesses and a diverse marketplace: 
It takes time to effect a readjustment of industrial life so that those 
who are thrown out of their own employment, by reason of such 
changes as we have spoken of, may find opportunities for labor in 
other departments than those to which they have been accustomed. It 
is a misfortune, but yet in such cases it seems to be the inevitable ac-
companiment of change and improvement. 
 
 11. Id. at 28–29. 
 12. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 69.  
 13. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
 14. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 15. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
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  It is wholly different, however, when such changes are affected by 
combinations of capital, whose purpose in combining is to control the 
production or manufacture of any particular article in the market, 
and by such control dictate the price at which the article shall be sold, 
the effect being to drive out of business all the small dealers in the 
commodity and to render the public subject to the decision of the 
combination as to what price shall be paid for the article. In this light 
it is not material that the price of the article may be lowered. It is in 
the power of the combination to raise it, and the result in any event is 
unfortunate for the country by depriving it of the services of a large 
number of small but independent dealers who were familiar with the 
business and who had spent their lives in it, and who supported 
themselves and their families from the small profits realized therein. 
Whether they be able to find other avenues to earn their livelihood is 
not so material, because it is not for the real prosperity of any country 
that such changes should occur which result in transferring an inde-
pendent business man, the head of his establishment, small though it 
might be, into a mere servant or agent of a corporation for selling the 
commodities which he once manufactured or dealt in, having no voice 
in shaping the business policy of the company and bound to obey or-
ders issued by others. Nor is it for the substantial interests of the 
country that any one commodity should be within the sole power and 
subject to the sole will of one powerful combination of capital.16 
Equally noteworthy is the Trans-Missouri Court’s comment:  
Trade or commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be 
badly and unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the 
small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, 
and who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered sur-
roundings. Mere reduction in the price of the commodity dealt in 
might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class, and the absorp-
tion of control over one commodity by an all-powerful combination of 
capital.17 
The Supreme Court thereafter thought the statements im-
portant enough to quote them twice, in decisions in 1941 and 
1966, a half century and more later.18 One cannot pretend that 
this language does not exist or that the Supreme Court did not 
know what it was talking about in 1897 when it expostulated 
the purposes of the Sherman Act. 
In their historical review, the Authors next give Aluminum 
Co. of America19 its usual bashing, for the usual reason: Hand 
is condemning Alcoa only for doing what a vigorous competitor 
is supposed to do, compete vigorously. One must admit that the 
oft-quoted language about how Alcoa anticipated every increase 
 
 16. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 323–24. 
 17. Id. at 323. 
 18. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274–75 (1966); Fa-
shion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941).  
 19. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.). 
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in demand and was prepared to supply it, etc.,20 appears to 
support the Authors’ position. Nonetheless, a full and close 
reading of the opinion reveals that Alcoa was not necessarily 
more sinned against than sinning, and provides some cover for 
Hand. Alcoa originally achieved its monopoly through contracts 
that required suppliers of electricity to not deal with competi-
tors and also by forming cartels with foreign manufacturers 
that agreed to withhold ingot imports from the United States.21 
Even after government decrees ended these practices, Alcoa en-
tered into a similar agreement to limit imports in 193622 and 
entered into an arrangement with a French competitor building 
an American plant, which left “no doubt that they were not to 
be competitors at arms length.”23 Notwithstanding Pacific Bell 
Telephone v. Linkline Communications, Inc.,24 which will be 
discussed later, Alcoa’s price squeeze—selling ingot to sheet 
rollers at prices that made it impossible to match Alcoa’s sheet 
prices—cannot be termed honestly industrious, procompetitive, 
or innocent, when Alcoa knew full well the effects of this prac-
tice.25 
Nor can Hand be accused of being out to get Alcoa, or even 
of ignoring his own statements that a monopoly achieved 
through “superior skill, foresight, and industry” is blameless. 
Time and again throughout the opinion, he defers to the find-
ings of the trial judge that Alcoa acted with innocent intent or 
for good faith business reasons in implementing practices chal-
lenged by the government. Time and again, Hand reiterates 
that it is not the place of an appellate court to second-guess the 
trial court’s appraisal of the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight to be given their testimony—a deference rarely seen in 
the present Supreme Court—and sustains trial court findings 
in Alcoa’s favor.26 Finally, the Supreme Court, in whose stead 
Hand was acting,27 thought enough of his decision to quote it at 
length with approval at the earliest opportunity.28 
 
 20. Id. at 431. 
 21. Id. at 422.  
 22. Id. at 444. 
 23. Id. at 431.  
 24. 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009). 
 25. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 438. 
 26. Id. at 433–35, 439, 441. 
 27. Id. at 421. 
 28. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813–14 (1946). 
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I have proffered a somewhat differing view of Alcoa be-
cause the Authors of the Article transition in their history from 
Alcoa to the Warren Court’s antitrust decisions as if Alcoa were 
somehow the portal through which the Warren Court passed 
into an antitrust Neverneverland, divorced from sound, basic 
economics and legislative intent. According to the Authors:  
[T]he Warren Court embraced a highly interventionist reading of the 
Clayton and Sherman Acts, employing the Acts to strike down many 
mergers with de minimis market effects and finding a host of busi-
ness practices to be per se illegal. . . . Perhaps most notable during 
this era was the Court’s hostility to efficiency as a goal of the Sher-
man Act.29 
Here, the Authors could be reminded of their own admoni-
tion, with which they begin their Article: “[W]hen a legislature 
builds an area of law around a fundamental, yet ill-defined, 
concept, it becomes difficult to craft doctrine without relying on 
conclusory labels. And conclusory labels fall prey to hopeless 
circularity.”30 “Efficiency” is just such a conclusory term that 
cries out for definition if it is to be part of the scaffold on which 
antitrust doctrine is built. The Authors fail to provide such a 
definition except in the dubious context of consumer harm. 
They correctly observe that, in the Warren Court’s view, 
“[s]uch . . . unconstrained competition was seen to yield a pa-
noply of benefits, including freedom of choice on the part of con-
sumers, liberal access to markets by prospective sellers, and 
dispersion of power.”31 In the absence of a definition of efficien-
cy, however, one must take issue with the Authors’ conclusion 
that the Court’s merger decisions “cannot be reconciled with an 
economic-efficiency approach,”32 unless, that is, the Authors are 
equating efficiency with consumer harm, as used by the Chica-
go school (i.e., price-output effects). If so, the Authors are giving 
credit to politics masquerading as economic theory, and bad 
economic theory at that, as will be discussed infra.  
One must also take issue with the Authors’ view that the 
Warren Court condemned out of hand tying arrangements and 
exclusive dealing agreements.33 Although characterized as per 
se violations, tying arrangements required a showing of market 
power in the tying product,34 which is still the law, with the ex-
 
 29. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 71.  
 30. Id. at 59.  
 31. Id. at 71–72. 
 32. Id. at 73. 
 33. Id. at 72.  
 34. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). 
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ception that market power is no longer presumed based on in-
tellectual property.35 In addition, the Warren Court treated ex-
clusive dealing agreements under the rule of reason, requiring 
a showing of substantial market foreclosure, just as courts do 
today.36 
The Authors’ criticism of the Warren Court culminates 
with their statement, “But if the preceding per se rules adopted 
by the Court can be questioned from an economic perspective, 
the Justices’ merger rulings were completely irreconcilable 
with such an approach,” with particular opprobrium for United 
States v. Von’s Grocery Co. and Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States.37 Again, the questions one must ask are “whose econom-
ics?” and “is conformance with Chicago school economics the 
proper purpose of United States antitrust laws?” 
The Authors provide a limited answer to these questions in 
their footnote ninety-five: “Although the antitrust jurispru-
dence of the Warren Court was anathema to many economists, 
it may in fact have been the most faithful to congressional in-
tent.”38 But they then dismiss this entirely accurate statement 
with a stunning non sequitur: “Since the Sherman Act is a 
common-law statute, however, original legislative intent—
assuming that it can even be discerned with any accuracy—is 
of little, if any, importance.”39  
There are two huge problems I see in this statement. First, 
as shown, original legislative intent can in fact be discerned 
with accuracy. Certainly, the Supreme Court had no trouble 
discerning that intent in the first half century after the Sher-
man Act’s passage nor did Professor Hovenkamp in his re-
search. Second, the Chicago school advocates that have success-
fully revolutionized—one is tempted to say undermined—
antitrust law in the past four decades, such as Bork and Eas-
terbrook, have done so largely on the basis of a misrepresenta-
 
 35. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).  
 36. See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
 37. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 73. The Authors comment that 
Von’s and Brown Shoe “cannot be reconciled with an economic-efficiency ap-
proach,” id., and add in a footnote, “Judge Posner has colorfully characterized 
the antitrust jurisprudence of the Warren Court era as an ‘intellectual dis-
grace,’” id. at n.93. Perhaps the authors were not aware that Judge Posner not 
only was the first lawyer on the brief for the United States in Von’s, but also 
“argued the cause for the United States” in the Supreme Court. United States 
v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 271, 271 (1966). 
 38. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 73 n.95. 
 39. Id. 
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tion of original legislative intent. They have falsely claimed 
that the primary intent of Congress in passing the Sherman 
Act was consumer welfare, allocative efficiency, and protecting 
consumers from high prices. If antitrust is to be rewritten on 
the basis of what Congress intended, then that intent is indeed 
important and needs to be accurately stated. The Authors 
should not so blithely dismiss the issue and yield the field to 
those who would usurp it under false pretenses.40 
Indeed, the Authors themselves fall back on Supreme 
Court precedent explicating the original intent underlying the 
Sherman Act in order to justify their advocacy of a total welfare 
standard to preserve the competitive process, rather than a 
consumer welfare standard:  
We believe that such an approach most faithfully comports with long-
established, and never-overruled, Supreme Court precedent. . . . For 
one, we consider that such an approach comports most closely with 
the one, transcendent principle that has characterized the history of 
U.S. antitrust enforcement—namely, that competition itself is of pri-
mary concern.41  
The Authors’ review of the past four decades of antitrust 
law and the Chicago school revolution is entirely accurate and 
unexceptionable, beginning with their comment, “The jurispru-
dence of the Warren Court is now considered discredited by 
those of an economic persuasion.”42 A number of the Authors’ 
statements summarize what has happened in antitrust as well 
as anyone could put the matter: 
 
 40.  A final point on which I take the Authors’ review of the Warren Court 
to task is their statement that although “Brown Shoe is often cited today for 
its applauded assertion that antitrust law protects competition rather than 
competitors[,] . . . [t]hose citing the decision often miss the irony that the out-
come in Brown Shoe was antithetical to this asserted principle.” Cudahy & 
Devlin, supra note 1, at 73 n.92. There was in fact no irony to the decision. To 
understand what the Supreme Court was saying, one needs to view the entire 
reference to competitors and competition:  
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we 
cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition 
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. 
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might 
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It 
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. 
We must give effect to that decision. 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Obviously, every-
thing after the first sentence has been conveniently ignored by those quoting 
the “competition, not competitors” language. 
 41. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 87 (citing Mandeville Island Farms, 
Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)); id. at 89.  
 42. Id. at 75.  
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[Chicago] School succeeded in convincing the courts and enforcement 
agencies that political concerns such as limiting concentration and 
ensuring ease of access to markets were in themselves irrelevant and, 
indeed, often diametrically opposed to the only relevant factor, which 
is efficiency.43 
  Having largely adopted the Chicago school’s view that antitrust 
law should be concerned with maximizing consumer welfare, the Su-
preme Court has reversed course on a vast array of per se rules.44 
  . . . [V]ast swathes of other conduct are assessed under the rule of 
reason to measure how they comport with notions of economic effi-
ciency, centered in particular on consumer welfare . . . .45 
What is unstated, perhaps because it is so obvious, is that 
virtually every one of these changes in antitrust law has fa-
vored defendants and has made both public and private en-
forcement more difficult. For example, following Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.46 and Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. v. California,47 and until American Needle, Inc. v. 
National Football League,48 the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in fourteen consecutive cases where an antitrust plaintiff 
had prevailed in the lower court, and reversed each one.49 
Where the Authors truly shine, in my view, is in their 
frank recognition that the driving force behind this sea change 
in antitrust has been politics just as much as, if not more than, 
economics:  
During the Sherman Act’s 120-year reign, the fundamental concept of 
what that legislation proscribes has proven highly unstable. It has 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 76. 
 45. Id. at 77. 
 46. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 47. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 48. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 49. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009); 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); Credit 
Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 
U.S. 28 (2006); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Volvo Trucks N. Am., 
Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006); F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 
526 U.S. 756 (1999); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brooke Grp. Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Spectrum Sports, 
Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993). The only exception to this string was 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), decided a week 
after Brooke Group. 
  
2011] COMMENT: ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT 103 
 
unquestionably been an evolving concept—one that mirrors the pre-
vailing political mood of the day.50 
. . . .  
. . . Prevailing political mood also played an important role in the rise 
of the Chicago school, since its emergence largely coincided with a 
rightward movement during the 1980s. Ronald Reagan’s appointment 
of leading conservative judges helped to cement the adoption of Chi-
cago principles within the law.51 
  As the preceding section explained, the nature of the conduct pro-
scribed by the Sherman Act has evolved in tandem with the larger so-
ciopolitical climate of which antitrust policy is merely a part.52 
 . . . .  
  As has been noted, the purposes and impact of the Sherman Act 
have shifted over its history to implicate larger political and economic 
concerns. . . . 53 It was not difficult to persuade believers in the 
wondrous powers of free markets that competition at the consumer 
level should be the sole concern of antitrust.54 
If anything, this point needs to be made even more strong-
ly, because the Authors have correctly and precisely described 
what has happened to antitrust in the last four decades. A po-
litical ideology, implacably hostile to the antitrust laws, has 
been able to transform those laws through the medium of a 
congenial and sympathetic school of economic theory, the pre-
mises of which have been aptly summarized by FTC Commis-
sioner J. Thomas Rosch: “. . . [t]hat antitrust law is concerned 
with maximizing societal welfare; that markets are generally 
perfect; that, if imperfect, they can and will correct themselves; 
that, accordingly, rational businesspeople will not engage in 
predatory conduct (because it is not profit-maximizing since 
markets will correct themselves).”55 
Commissioner Rosch, however, has also come to the view 
That the “ideology of the free-market fundamentalists” is arguably 
“bankrupt”; that markets cannot be as efficient and self-correcting as 
orthodox Chicago school economists would have it because informa-
tion is imperfect and human beings do not always act rationally; that 
there is a need for government intervention to control speculative 
bubbles; and that monopolies are not the most efficient distributor of 
resources. . . . . . .[and] that vigorous antitrust enforcement could and 
 
 50. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 77. 
 51. Id. at 77 n.121. 
 52. Id. at 78. 
 53. Id. at 84. 
 54. Id. 
 55.  J. Thomas Rosch, The Redemption of a Republican, FTC: WATCH 
(Wash. Regulatory Reporting Grp., Springfield, Va.), June 1, 2009, at 2. 
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should play a substantial role in whatever government intervention is 
appropriate.56 
The current worldwide economic crisis, which is the result 
of deregulation and the unfettered market run wild, supports 
Commissioner Rosch’s conclusions and discredits the economic 
philosophy that has informed the recasting of the antitrust 
laws over the last four decades. But just as it is important to 
recognize that the changes in antitrust law have been political-
ly motivated, and that the Chicago school of economics, which 
was used to lend credibility to these changes, has been found 
wanting by recent events, it is important to question who advo-
cates for and who benefits from this view of antitrust. The an-
swer is that the major proponents and beneficiaries are the 
very holders of concentrated economic power that the antitrust 
laws were originally meant to curb. The term “regulatory cap-
ture” applies here, to antitrust law, with a vengeance. With ef-
ficiency now the summum bonum of antitrust, economic power 
is secure and in charge.  
The Authors deserve great credit for pointing out the cru-
cial link between politics and antitrust, and at least beginning 
a public dialogue that I believe is long overdue. 
There is, however, one area of antitrust that the Authors 
have not touched, which I believe should be briefly discussed in 
order to understand fully what is at stake in making the deci-
sion whether to adopt an aggregate welfare or consumer wel-
fare definition of anticompetitive effect. This is the procedural 
side of antitrust practice today, and what has happened in the 
realm of procedure during the same period that the Chicago 
school became ascendant in shaping the substance of antitrust 
law. Procedurally, exactly the same type of transition has oc-
curred, with the deck becoming heavily stacked against plain-
tiffs and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 157 becoming more or 
less a dead letter for plaintiffs. 
Before Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,58 which 
the Authors see as the “turning point” in the change of direc-
tion for substantive antitrust law,59 the procedural landscape 
was far different from what it is today. The sufficiency of the 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. “These rules . . . should be construed and administered to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 58. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 59. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 75. 
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complaint was governed by Conley v. Gibson,60 a minimal no-
tice pleading standard. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. dictated that “summary procedures should be used 
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and in-
tent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the 
alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”61 
Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, “the right to trial by 
jury applies to treble damage suits under the antitrust laws, 
and is, in fact, an essential part of the congressional plan for 
making competition rather than monopoly the rule of 
trade . . . .”62 There were no heightened or special proceedings 
for ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony. Although 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.63 had just been de-
cided, concepts of antitrust injury and standing were largely in-
choate and undeveloped, if not downright liberal.64 Finally, if 
plaintiffs could not obtain a remedy in federal court, state 
courts frequently proved hospitable and had the freedom to 
provide redress forbidden under federal antitrust laws if autho-
rized by their legislatures.65 
What has happened since that time procedurally is that 
antitrust litigation has turned into an obstacle course for plain-
tiffs, with substantial hurdles at every stage of the proceedings. 
In a series of decisions that can be characterized as granting 
lower courts a hunting license to eliminate plaintiffs and their 
claims, the Supreme Court has (1) created heightened pleading 
standards for complaints,66 so that no case now proceeds with-
out a rule 12(b)(6) challenge; (2) sub silentio overruled Poller,67 
and has authorized, if not encouraged, trial courts to grant 
summary judgment in antitrust cases; (3) instructed trial 
courts that they are the “gatekeepers” of expert testimony, 
which they are required and encouraged to exclude if they find 
it wanting after special motion practice and hearings subject to 
 
 60.  355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 61.  368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). 
 62.  Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959).  
 63.  429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 64. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 648–50 
(1969); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1957). 
 65. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100–06 (1989). 
 66. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–63 (2007). 
 67. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–
88 (1986). 
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an extremely deferential standard of review;68 and (4) devel-
oped vague and convoluted rules of standing and antitrust in-
jury,69 which has the effect of authorizing further dismissal of 
antitrust cases. Finally, Congress passed the Orwellian-named 
Class Action Fairness Act of 200570 to ensure that most state 
court class actions will be litigated in federal courts.  
Especially worthy of comment are the Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp. and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, which import in-
to antitrust law the requirement that claims be “plausible” in 
terms of making economic sense.71 There are three enormous 
problems concealed within this plausibility standard. The first 
is that plausibility is inherently a subjective judgment that the 
trial judge is authorized, indeed required, to make—a judgment 
that will necessarily rest on and be guided by each judge’s be-
liefs, experiences, and prejudices. The second problem is that 
the requirement of plausibility assumes, on the basis of no evi-
dence whatsoever, that every federal judge is competent to 
make a determination of what is economically plausible, and 
invests the federal judiciary with economic competency wheth-
er they have it or not. The third problem is that the decisions 
requiring economic plausibility provide no guidance as to whose 
economic theories are to be deemed plausible. Although one 
might conclude that the Court has endorsed the Chicago school, 
the current economic crisis would counsel against a too ready 
embrace of that discredited orthodoxy. The predictable result of 
the diktat “to go forth and be plausible” is that the wolves on 
the bench have been turned loose on the antitrust sheep. 
Thus, at the same time that the substantive law of anti-
trust has swung heavily in favor of the defense side, so too has 
antitrust’s procedural aspects, with public and private en-
forcement becoming increasingly difficult as a practical matter 
in the federal courts. The hostility of courts to antitrust over 
the past four decades has mirrored a corresponding hostility to 
enforcement litigation; the politics informing the constriction of 
antitrust law similarly inform the progressive closing of the 
courthouse doors and denial of access to justice. The closing of 
 
 68. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999); Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–595 (1993). 
 69. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Car-
penters, 459 U.S. 519, 535–46 (1983).  
 70. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2005). 
 71. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564–70; Matsushita, 574 U.S. at 587–88. 
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the procedural vise on antitrust plaintiffs is as significant as 
the closing of the substantive vise in understanding what is at 
stake in choosing aggregate welfare over consumer welfare as 
the standard for measuring anticompetitive effect. 
II.  CHOOSING THE STANDARD; WHAT IS AT STAKE   
The Authors argue thoroughly, systematically, and persua-
sively for selecting aggregate welfare over consumer welfare as 
the appropriate standard for determining anticompetitive ef-
fect. Aggregate welfare means finding anticompetitive effect if 
there is an impairment to the competitive process at any level 
or stage of that process, while consumer welfare means looking 
only to see if there are effects at the level of consumers, in 
terms of higher prices, reduced output, lower quality, or dimi-
nished choice, as the Authors repeatedly make clear.  
What is implicit in their argument, but not made express, 
is that the choice of aggregate welfare or consumer welfare will 
have an enormous and decisive impact on who can sue, and 
hence on the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. Choosing 
aggregate welfare as the measure of anticompetitive effect will 
empower a wide range of plaintiffs to bring private enforcement 
actions, not merely consumers, but also competitors, suppliers, 
resellers, and potentially anyone else whose ability to compete 
is impaired. As the Authors point out, this would be fully con-
sistent with prior expressions by the Supreme Court that the 
protection of the antitrust laws is not limited but extends to all 
who may be injured by a violation.72  
Such an expansive definition of anticompetitive effect is al-
so fully consonant with the Supreme Court’s frequent asser-
tions of the importance of private antitrust enforcement.73  
 
 72. Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 1, at 87 (“The statute does not confine 
its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. 
Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. 
The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are 
made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpe-
trated.” (citing Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 
U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (citations omitted))).  
 73. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 n.10 
(1982) (“[P]rivate suits are an important element of the Nation’s antitrust en-
forcement effort: ‘Congress created the treble-damages remedy . . . precisely 
for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These 
private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources availa-
ble to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring 
violations.’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344)); Reiter, 442 
U.S. at 344 (1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 
  
108 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [95:92 
 
Equally significant is that a competitor is likely to sustain 
injuries much greater in dollar amount than an individual con-
sumer and to have the resources necessary to support antitrust 
litigation than an individual consumer. In other words, a com-
petitor is more likely to have both the incentive and the means 
to pursue private antitrust enforcement than an individual 
consumer. The same is undoubtedly true for suppliers and re-
sellers. Selecting aggregate welfare is thus all but assured of 
yielding a vigorous climate of private antitrust enforcement. 
On the other hand, the choice of consumer welfare as the 
measure of anticompetitive effect will, as a practical matter, 
yield but a single enforcer, one that is subject to unremitting 
political pressure and constraints on its resources—the federal 
government.  
I believe that the federal government will in effect be the 
only enforcer of the antitrust laws under a consumer welfare 
standard for two reasons. First, because the standard requires 
finding adverse effects at the consumer level, other market par-
ticipants, such as competitors, will experience the courts de-
termining with increased frequency that they lack standing to 
raise claims of consumer injury—or that their injuries are not 
antitrust injuries—because they are not consumer injuries. 
Thus, the types of plaintiffs able to bring private antitrust ac-
tions will drastically diminish. One must assume that the pro-
ponents of the consumer injury definition are well aware of this 
and desire it. 
The second reason is that I believe that private consumer 
enforcement actions are neither independent of the government 
nor especially effective as a means of securing redress for in-
jury or deterring future violations. By far the most common 
manifestation of consumer enforcement is the consumer class 
action. By far the most common impetus for the filing of a con-
sumer class action is a government investigation, grand jury, 
indictment, or conviction. In sum, private class actions are es-
sentially pilot fish that swim with the government shark, which 
they depend on for their sustenance. They pursue their quarry 
 
100, 130–31 (1969) (“Moreover, the purpose of giving private parties treble-
damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but 
was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.”); Perma 
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (“[T]he purpos-
es of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will 
be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in 
violation of the antitrust laws.”).  
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only so long as the government does. When the government ab-
andons the hunt, too often so does the private class action bar. 
In terms of effectiveness, the private plaintiffs class action 
bar has developed a regrettable reputation for enriching itself 
at the expense of its putative clients—U.S. consumers. Even a 
full recovery is likely to net class members relatively small 
compensation compared to what class counsel receive as attor-
ney fees. Unfortunately, this is what makes the violation so at-
tractive to the defendants in the first place: these defendants 
are able to amass vast illicit profits by stealing a pittance from 
each of millions of consumer class members. It does not change 
the public perception, however, of lawyers profiting uncons-
cionably while their clients gain little. This adverse perception 
has sadly been exacerbated by such devices as coupon settle-
ments. The deterrent effect of private class actions also appears 
negligible, as many defendants are serial offenders and recidiv-
ists going from one price-fixing conspiracy to the next. Almost 
none of the consumer class actions ever proceed to trial. No 
state court action brought under the Class Action Fairness Act 
has ever been tried to judgment. 
Indeed, the advocates of the consumer injury standard are 
no doubt content with confining private enforcement to con-
sumer class actions, which are now constrained by their depen-
dence on government enforcement, changes to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23, the Class Action Fairness Act, and what is 
anticipated to be the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.74 
These constraints leave the federal government as the 
primary, if not only, enforcer of the antitrust laws. This would 
no doubt be more than satisfactory to advocates of the consum-
er welfare standard for two principal reasons. First, as the Su-
preme Court observed in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., there are on-
ly “limited resources available to the Department of Justice for 
enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.”75 Given 
the rise of the Tea Party and the composition of the current 
Congress, those resources are unlikely to increase and are like-
 
 74. 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795. 
 75. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 344; see also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Anti-
trust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 664 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The Justice Department has 
limited resources; in the entire decade of the 1990s, it brought fewer than 200 
civil antitrust cases . . . .”); Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 
252, 260 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The government, with its limited resources, cannot be 
relied upon as the sole initiator of enforcement actions. That is why Congress 
authorized private enforcement of the antitrust laws.”). 
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ly to be even more limited, particularly if the government 
threatens to intensify its enforcement efforts. 
Second, as shown, the Authors have accurately focused on 
and described the political forces and pressures underlying the 
historical vicissitudes of antitrust jurisprudence. Government 
enforcement not only is subject to political influence and pres-
sure in its functioning, but it is also a creature of politics, the 
primary purpose of which is to advance the political agenda of 
the administration it serves. The advocates of the consumer in-
jury standard are no doubt well satisfied with this situation, 
particularly in view of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Citizens United v. FEC,76 which prohibits limits on corporate 
spending in support of favored political causes and sympathetic 
politicians. Indeed, Citizens United may turn out to be one of 
the most influential decisions on antitrust enforcement since 
the passage of the Sherman Act. The more resources a defen-
dant is able to throw against the reelection of the current ad-
ministration, the less likely the administration may be to bring 
an antitrust enforcement action against that corporation. This 
is the real world in which enforcers choose to enforce, or not to 
enforce. 
It is also a compelling reason why it is crucial to the viabil-
ity of future antitrust enforcement to adopt, as the Authors 
urge, an aggregate welfare definition of anticompetitive effect, 
rather than a consumer welfare definition. 
Finally, in my mind, there is one additional important rea-
son for adopting the aggregate welfare standard. This involves 
the definition of anticompetitive conduct, as distinguished from 
anticompetitive effect. One could simply say that anticompeti-
tive conduct is conduct that produces an anticompetitive effect, 
and then look at aggregate effects or consumer effects depend-
ing on the applicable standard. To do so, however, would be to 
ignore significant decisions of the Supreme Court, which point 
strongly in favor of the aggregate welfare standard, in particu-
lar Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.77  
In Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court defined predatory 
conduct by saying, “[I]f a firm has been ‘attempting to exclude 
rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to charac-
terize its behavior as predatory.”78 Perhaps the formulation 
 
 76. 130 S. Ct. 876, 896–99 (2010). 
 77. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).  
 78. Id. at 605 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 138 
(1978)).  
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may be deceptively simple, but no one can claim it to be outside 
the comprehension of the ordinary juror. A number of courts 
have employed it.79 “Efficiency” as used by the Supreme Court 
in its language in Aspen Skiing obviously connotes conduct not 
honestly industrious or undertaken for a good faith business 
justification (i.e., conduct that would not be undertaken except 
for its tendency to exclude rivals). In focusing on the conduct’s 
tendency to exclude rivals, moreover, the Supreme Court is say-
ing that effects on competitors matter, and is pointing strongly 
in the direction of an aggregate welfare standard. 
  CONCLUSION   
Plaintiffs’ antitrust counsel, including this one, never tire 
of quoting the words of Justice Marshall in United States v. 
Topco Associates, Inc.: 
  Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are 
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the pre-
servation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the 
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no mat-
ter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagi-
nation, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can 
muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be forec-
losed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain pri-
vate citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote 
greater competition in a more important sector of the economy.80 
The Article Anticompetitive Effect is important because it 
deals with an issue both fundamental and crucial to whether 
Justice Marshall’s words will continue to have meaning. It is 
 
 79.  Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2002); M 
& M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 
166 (4th Cir. 1992); Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 
186, 188–91 (2d Cir. 1992); Pac. Express, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 
814, 818 (9th Cir. 1992); Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler 
Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1990); Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Moun-
tain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1987); Drinkwine v. Federated Publ’ns, 
Inc., 780 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1985); Catch Curve, Inc. v. Venali, Inc., 519 F. 
Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Compuware Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 
366 F. Supp. 2d 475, 486 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Appleton 
Papers Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145–46 (D. Minn. 1999); Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 883 F. Supp. 1247, 1257 (W.D. Wis. 
1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir.); Sun-
shine Cellular v. Vanguard Cellular Sys., 810 F. Supp. 486, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); 
Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1273–74 (E.D. 
Pa. 1987); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1287, 
1332–33 (D. Kan. 1986), aff’d, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990); Willamette Den-
tal Grp., P.C. v. Or. Dental Serv. Corp., 882 P.2d 637, 641 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
 80. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
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also laudable for speaking in candid terms about the original 
legislative intent behind the Sherman Act, the historical battle 
over who shall control the interpretation and application of the 
antitrust laws, and the political underpinnings of that battle. 
Finally, it identifies a question—the definition of anticompeti-
tive effect—that will determine which way the battle for the fu-
ture of antitrust will turn. Although the Authors speak in the 
technical language of aggregate welfare versus consumer wel-
fare, what is at stake is not the resolution of an esoteric eco-
nomic debate, but instead the practical outcome of whether 
those who were meant to be regulated by the antitrust laws 
will themselves become the regulators and then use those very 
laws to entrench and perpetuate the inequalities of power and 
wealth that originally prompted Congress to enact them in 
1890. 
This Comment has tried to show that the Authors are right 
in their advocacy of an aggregate welfare standard, and that 
the argument and its resolution are far more important than 
even the Authors, in their modesty, claim. 
